Everything started in early
1946 when the Indian National Congress had to elect a new president. It was an
accepted fact that the leader chosen as Congress president would become the
first prime minister of independent India. Three candidates were in the race:
Acharya Kripalani, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Sardar Patel. The working committee of
the INC and the pradesh committees had to send their nomination for one of the
three candidates.
Sardar Patel was easily the
most popular. Everyone knew his efficiency and his toughness for tackling
difficult problems. Twelve out of 19 Pradesh committees nominated him. None
nominated Nehru.
From the start Gandhi had
indicated that he favoured Nehru. His reasoning was that his British education
was an asset: 'Jawaharlal
cannot be replaced today whilst the charge is being taken from the British. He,
a Harrow boy, a Cambridge graduate, and a barrister, is wanted to carry on the
negotiations with the Englishmen.'
Another point Gandhi made was
that while Sardar Patel would agree to work as Nehru's deputy, the reverse
might not happen. He also felt that Nehru was better known abroad and could
help India play a role in international affairs.
Eventually, in deference
to Gandhi, Kripalani nominated Nehru and withdrew from the race. Patel had no
choice but to follow his colleague 'so
that Nehru could be elected unopposed.' Dr
Rajendra Prasad later stated: 'Gandhi has once again sacrificed his trusted
lieutenant for the sake of the glamorous Nehru.'
It is how India got a Kashmiri
Pandit as its first prime minister.
I have always found it strange
that a man professing to be above caste or religion agreed to be called
'Panditji.' Nonetheless, the fact that a Pandit was the prime minister made
Kashmir a state different from the 500 other princely states.
Soon, the conflicting aspects
in Nehru's persona came to the fore. On one hand, he was a democrat and
revolutionary; on the other, he was often carried away by his 'Socialist'
ideals to the point of blundering with India's destiny.
After his election as Congress
president, he gave his support to his friend Sheikh Abdullah (he called him his
'blood brother') who had been jailed by Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir. In June
1946, he decided to go to the valley to free Abdullah. The situation was
certainly not shining in Kashmir (as in the rest of India), but to take on the
maharaja at this point in time was a serious mistake.
However, for Nehru, 'Anything that happens in Kashmir has a
certain importance for the rest of India, but recent events there have had an
even greater importance, [they] became symbols of a larger struggle for
emancipation. Thus Kashmir became symbolic of the [princely] States in India.' He wanted to take on 'the autocratic and often
feudal rule that prevails there.' He
did not realise that the princes' support and collaboration would be
indispensable during this all-important transition period for the nation.
Though prohibited to enter the
maharaja's state, in July 1946 Nehru decided to defy the ban. Patel and other
members of the working committee tried to dissuade him: there were more
important matters to tackle in Delhi after the Cabinet Mission had come to
discuss the transfer of power.
In a letter to D P Mishra,
Patel explained: 'He [Nehru] has done many things recently which have caused
us great embarrassment. His actions in Kashmir … are acts of emotional
insanity and it puts tremendous strain on us to set the matters right.'However,
Patel, always fair, added: 'but in spite of all these innocent indiscretions
he has unparalleled enthusiasm and a burning passion for freedom.' Patel, thus, pointed out the two
powerful (and opposing) aspects of Nehru's personality.
A year later, hardly two weeks
before Independence, Nehru still wanted to go to Srinagar. He wrote to Gandhi:
'I shall go ahead with my plans. As between visiting Kashmir when my people
need me there and being prime minister, I prefer the former.'Once again he
had to be dissuaded.
At the stroke of the midnight
hour on August 14, India awakened to life and freedom. Unfortunately, Maharaja
Hari Singh remembered the events of the previous year and while most princes
signed the Instrument of Accession of their state to the Dominion of India,
Hari Singh prevaricated. What would happen to him and his state under Nehru's
rule? He also knew that the future of his state could not lie with Jinnah and
his government.
In September, he decided to
offer Kashmir's accession to India. This was refused by Nehru, who first wanted
Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as prime minister of the state. This
was not acceptable to the maharaja.
Things came to a head at the
end of October 1947 when raiders from the North West Frontier Province entered
the state, killing, looting, and raping along. On October 26, they had reached
the outskirts of Srinagar. Hari Singh agreed to sign the Instrument of
Accession.
On the same day a historic
meeting was held in Delhi with Mountbatten, the governor general, as chairman.
A young army colonel named Sam Manekshaw, who attended the meeting, recalled: 'As usual
Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God Almighty, everybody,
until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, 'Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give
it away?' He [Nehru] said, 'Of course, I want Kashmir.' Then he [Patel] said: 'Please give your orders.'
This anecdote perfectly
exemplifies Nehru, who could make the greatest speeches, but was unable to take
a decision at a crucial moment. Thanks to Patel's decisiveness, troops were
flown to Srinagar the next morning and the airport, the only link with India,
was saved. Military operations to expel the raiders started.
Nehru's colleagues soon
discovered they had made another serious blunder, a collective one. They had
chosen Mountbatten to be the first governor general of independent India while
Jinnah had kept the post for himself in Pakistan. At that time, it was probably
easier for the Congress to have a foreigner as the head of the Dominion; it
conveniently avoided having to choose among themselves. However, Mountbatten
manipulated matters so well that he became chairman of a newly created defence
council. Nehru did not see a problem in this: Mountbatten (and his wife) were
his best friends.
But this was to have grave
repercussions on Kashmir policy. Mountbatten, a British officer, was now at the
helm of the executive defence machinery. British generals still serving in
India reported to him. Mountbatten was not working for India's interests, but
the British crown's.
Nehru's sentimental attachment
to the Mountbattens deeply vitiated the Kashmir issue. It was certainly the most important factor for the failure to find a solution in the
first years of the conflict.
Events took a turn for the
worse at the end of December 1947 when the governor general managed to convince
Nehru that India had to refer the Kashmir issue to the UN instead of conducting
a military counterattack in West Punjab. Patel did not agree. But at this
precise point in time the Sardar, who had so far looked after the relations
with the princely states, was sidetracked. On December 23, he wrote his
resignation, but was prevented (by Gandhi) from pressing for it. From that day,
with Patel out of Kashmir affairs, things went from bad to worse.
In the first months of 1948,
during the UN hearings, the British showed where their interests lay. The
original Indian complaint was completely left aside and the Security Council
began adopting anti-India resolutions.
Abdullah had already started
his crusade (particularly with the US administration) for Kashmir's
independence. He remained Nehru's friend till his scheming became too dangerous
for India. In August 1953, he was finally dismissed by Karan Singh, thesadar-i-riyasat. Two
months earlier, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, who had been arrested by Abdullah and
left without medical care in Srinagar, died in mysterious circumstances. Nehru
had visited the capital of Kashmir a few days earlier, but did not find the
time to call on his former Cabinet colleague. He later wrote to Mookerjee's
mother: 'Indeed, I hoped that the healthy climate of Kashmir might lead to
an improvement in Shyama Babu's health.'
Though in the following years
Nehru hardened his position when different UN commissions (Dixon, Graham,
Jarring) visited Delhi, it was too late. Pakistan was certainly not
interested in vacating the so-called 'Azad Kashmir', rendering the plans
for a plebiscite mentioned in the UN resolutions of August 1948 and January
1949 irrelevant.
A few days before his death
Nehru sent a freshly released Abdullah to meet Ayub Khan with a proposal to
have a confederation of India, Pakistan and Kashmir. The proposal was
contemptuously rejected as 'absurd' by the Pakistani military ruler. It was
Nehru's last attempt to solve the issue and it failed.
In retrospect, despite Nehru's
love for great principles, his incapacity to take decisions in time, his
inability to work with colleagues like Patel, and his friendship with
individuals such as the Mounbattens or Abdullah, who had their own interests,
blinded him so much that he did not further India's national interests. The
consequences have been tragic and the muddle created 57 years ago remains far
from being sorted out.
